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ues, " [Tlhe issue is not how to get wide 
participation in early warning. The 
real issue is how to get broader partici- 
pation in global-scale decisim-mak- 
ing." Perhaps the proposed academic 
policy consortium could contemplate 
encouraging participation of this na- 
ture as a principal task? 
These are the issues. We can debate 
their relative merits, but, in the end, we 
come back to the key issues. Should we 
invest in early warning? If yes, who is 
responsible, where and how should it 
be done? And, can we develop an ef- 
fective and useful early warning sys- 
tem? If yes, how and to what end? 
Whatever steps are taken, lessons 
learned from past and recent humani- 
tarian crises must and should form the 
background and foreground for the 
focus of international action and indi- 
vidual endeavour. 
Notes 
1. This is discussed by GavanDuffy, Ted 
Robert Gurr, Philip A. Schrodt, Gottfried 
Mayer-Kress and Peter Breckein "AnEarly 
Waming System for the United Nations: 
Internet or Not?" in the "The Forum," 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 
39, Supplement 2, October 1995,315-26. 
2. See "Reliefweb: Mandate and Objectives" 
in this issue. 
3. See 'Towards the Development of an Early 
Waming/Response Network in this is- 
sue. 
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Ce brefarticle porte un regard critique 
sur les micanismes d'alerte prhentive 
en place actuellement et hoque des en- 
jeux similaires d ceux soulevis par l'ar- 
ticle de Sharon Rusu. L'auteur tente ici 
dedicrire la nature et le fonctionnement 
du s y s t h e  existant, les acteurs qui y 
sont engage's ainsi les imperfections et 
lacunes de processus L n s  son e'tat ac- 
tuel. 
Increasingly, large-scale refugee 
movements and other humanitarian 
disasters (famine, environmental cri- 
ses, economic collapse, the breakdown 
of state structures) are caused by wars, 
especially civil wars, and prolonged 
internal conflicts. If humanity is to 
avert such disasters, we need to de- 
velop new means of conflict preven- 
tion. This in turn depends, in part, on 
developing effective mechanisms to 
provide early warning of potential 
conflicts. 
Since the end of the Cold War, 
policy-makers and governments have 
accepted the need to develop new 
means of conflict prevention. In An 
Agenda for Peace, United Nations (UN) 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali highlighted the importance and 
potential of various forms of 'preven- 
tive diplomacy.' The Clinton adminis- 
tration views conflict prevention as a 
central element of the United States' 
post-Cold War foreign policy. Many 
other governments are sympathetic to 
the idea. Regional bodies such as the 
Organization for Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe (OSCE) and the Or- 
ganization of African Unity (OAU) 
now see conflict prevention as one of 
their key roles. 
Putting conflict prevention into 
practice, however, is more difficult. 
Andrew Cottey, Department of Peace Studies, 
University of Bradford, U.K. 
The development of effective mecha- 
nisms for early warning of potential 
violent conflicts is inherently problem- 
atic. Political instability, economic de- 
cline, disputes over borders or ethnic 
minorities, mobilization of peoples 
and increased arms flows may be signs 
of impending conflicts. However, 
many, perhaps even most, countries 
are characterized by some of these fea- 
tures. Determining which particular 
regions and countries are most likely 
to escalate to warfare-and therefore 
require urgent attention-is far more 
difficult. Although the UN and re- 
gional organizations are beginning to 
develop mechanisms to provide early 
warning of impending conflicts, how 
far these mechanisms can be truly ef- 
fective is not yet clear. 
Even if effective early warning 
mechanisms are established, they will 
be of little use if warnings are ignored 
or side-lined. Internal UN reports, for 
example, warned of plans for the geno- 
cide that was to occur in Rwanda in 
1994, but were suppressed because 
they were politically inconvenient for 
some governments. Many observers 
warned from Tito's death in 1980 on- 
wards of the potential for conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia, and the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency specifi- 
cally warned in 1990 of impending 
conflict. 
Further, even where the political 
will to take action exists, developing 
effective policies is difficult. Neutral 
mediation and conflict resolution ef- 
forts may be effective in some circum- 
stances. In many conflict situations, 
however, positions are deeply en- 
trenched or the parties involved have 
an active interest in perpetuating the 
conflict. In these circumstances, 'ra- 
tional' diplomatic persuasion and 
'good offices' are unlikely to resolve 
real differences. Bringing pressure to 
bear on parties to a conflict, however, 
is difficult and poses its own dilem- 
- - - -- 
Refige, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1996) 11 
mas. Economic sanctions are a blunt 
instrument, whose record of success is 
dubious. Some analysts argue that pre- 
ventive military intervention may 
sometimes be the only realistic option. 
But this also raises obvious risks and 
dangers. 
An underlying problem is the dis- 
juncture between states commitments 
to the idea of conflict prevention and 
the resources they are willing to invest 
and the risks they are willing to take to 
prevent conflicts. Many observers ar- 
gue that had the major Western pow- 
ers been willing to deploy a substantial 
preventive force in Bosnia in late 1991 
or early 1992 the subsequent conflict 
might have been avoided. Similarly, 
some suggest that had the UN pres- 
ence in Rwanda been increased when 
violence escalated in the spring of 1994 
much bloodshed could have been 
averted. Instead, the UN Security 
Council, wary of the risks of deeper 
involvement, chose to reduce the UN 
peacekeeping force in that country. 
Whether those states with the power to 
take more effective action have the will 
or the interest to do so is therefore open 
to doubt. 
Some Third World states also fear 
that early warning and conflict preven- 
tion could become an excuse for grow- 
ing Western interference in their 
internal affairs. With most conflicts 
occurring within states, early warning 
and action to tackle conflicts inevitably 
implies increased monitoring, of and 
intervention in, the domestic politics 
of states where conflict may be likely. 
Such fears have led some Third World 
states to oppose the setting up of an 
inter-agency early warning mecha- 
nism within the UN, stalling progress 
in this area. More broadly, there is a 
risk that Western-led efforts to develop 
early warning and conflict prevention 
mechanisms could come to be seen as 
part of a new 'neo-imperialism,' con- 
tributing to the growing polarization 
of North-South relations. 
If these various problems are to be 
overcome, there is a need to develop 
approaches which are less dependent 
on the short-term attention and nar- 
row interests of particular states and 
governments. Strengthened interna- 
tional organizations, whose action 
does not always depend on the active 
support of governments, are one way 
forward. Within the UN, the Depart- 
ment of Political Affairs was set up by 
Boutros-Ghali specifically to support 
conflict prevention and resolution. Its 
confidential mediation efforts have 
probably helped to prevent a number 
of latent conflicts from escalating to 
violence. Within Europe, the OSCEfs 
High Commissioner on National Mi- 
norities has helped to promote dia- 
logue in a number of potential ethnic 
conflicts and is widely regarded as an 
important success story for conflict 
prevention. 
Another approach is to support the 
development of non-governmental 
groups involved in grassroots conflict 
resolution and peace-building efforts. 
Some analysts, disillusioned with the 
failure of more traditional state-centric 
and government oriented approaches, 
suggest that this may be a key area for 
development. Bodies like the Euro- 
pean Union, for instance, could pro- 
vide far greater financial support for 
non-governmental conflict prevention 
and resolution efforts in Eastern Eu- 
rope, the former Soviet Union and 
Africa. 
Conflict early warning and preven- 
tion face very real problems. We are, 
however, at a relatively early stage in 
their post-Cold War development. The 
UN Department of Political Affairs 
and the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities provide an indica- 
tion of the potential for success. If we 
are to make further progress, there is a 
need for a wide range of new and im- 
aginative approaches. The conflict pre- 
vention agenda, further, needs to be 
broadened to address the underlying 
causes of conflict in many parts of the 
world (poverty, the lack of democracy 
and respect for human rights, environ- 
mental degradation, arms prolifera- 
tion). 
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